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Abstract: The program of Payment for Environmental Services (PESP) in Costa Rica 
is considered as a reference since it has been a pioneer national PES program and has 
been successful regarding total contracted area and the level of investment. Whereas 
many debates have been developed regarding its environmental efficiency and its 
poverty impacts, discussion on its nature are still critical and open a continuos debate 
on PES definitions. Although intermediary actors are important stakeholders in the 
PES functioning , their role has been poorly analyzed yet. Mobilizing the concept of 
global comodity chain, transaction cost and system of services, we analyzes the role 
of the local intermediary organizations (LIO) in the functioning and performance of 
the PESP, en particular regarding small farmers access to PESP. We show that LIO 
have different origins, structure, visions and objectives about the forest sector and 
PES program. Although they are not clearly reducing landowners’ transaction costs, 
they are facilitating smallholders’ access to the program thanks to the provision of a 
set of tangible and intangible services. They reduce information asymmetry in the 
system and enlarge the scope of PESP with alternative complementary schemes. 
Finally PESP appears neither as pure market coordination nor a hierarchical 
coordination, but a complex hybrid institution, where public private partnership is 
taking place between central public intermediary (FONAFIFO) and private local 
intermediary organizations. 
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1 Introduction 
Payment for Environmental Services (PES) emerged in the 90s and developed 
rapidly in the 2000s as a mechanism to overcome limits of existing instrument 
for conservation (Wunder, 2005). Following the millenium ecosystem 
assessment, attention of scholars and policy makers rose rapidly on PES 
mechanism and led to two main debates. A first debate emerged regarding 
definition and conceptualization of PES. Whereas first definition of PES 
proposed by Wunder (2005) put emphasis on contractual agreements and 
market characteristics, a more comprehensive definition was further proposed, 
which conceptualized PES as collective action (Muradian et al., 2010). Along 
with this debate, a discussion emerges on the characterization of PES 
governance. Whereas some authors tends to consider PES as a market 
coordination (Wunder et al., 2008), others highlight the complex nature of 
PES and its hybrid governance (Muradian and Rival, 2012). The second 
debate on PES is related to its effect and impact on conservation and 
development. Whereas some authors argue for the potential of PES to face 
environmental and poverty alleviation issues under certain conditions (Engel 
et al., 2008; Milder et al., 2010), other have a more skeptical consideration 
underlying genuine limits of PES schemes (Muradian et al., 2013). 
 
In these two debate, few attention has been given to the PES intermediary, 
that is to say the actors that facilitate the transaction between between ES 
users and providers (Wunder, 2005), or the transfer of resources between 
actors (Muradian et al., 2010). However, in all PES schemes, one or various 
actors are playing this role, and thus participate to PES coordination and may 
influence its results.  
 
Considered as a PES reference, the case of the Payment for Environmental 
Services Program (PESP) in Costa Rica has been largely analyzed (Schomers 
and Matzdorf, 2013).  Its nature (Wunder et al., 2008; Fletcher and Breitling, 
2012), environmental effects (Arriagada et al., 2012; Daniels et al., 2010; 
Robalino et al., 2011; Sánchez-Azofeifa et al., 2007), economic and social 
implication (Miranda et al., 2003; Ortiz et al., 2003; Zbinden and Lee, 2005), 
and institutional performance (Legrand, 2013) has been largely discussed. In 
the implementation of the PESP, the role of the National Forestry Fund 
(FONAFIFO), as central intermediary of the mechanism, has been analyzed  
(Pagiola, 2008) as well as the participation of diffferent stakeholders in PESP 
governance (Le Coq et al., 2013). However, although some authors highlight 
the role of local forestry organizations in the development of Costa Rican 
forestry sector (Barrantes, 2009), and their involvement in the implementation 
in the PESP (Méndez Gamboa and Salazar Chaves, 2010), their role in PESP 
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functioning and their contribution to the results of PESP have been poorly 
analyzed yet.  
Thus, this communication aims at analyzing the role of the local intermediary 
organizations in the functioning and the results of the PESP. 
 
After a setting a clarification background regarding intermediary in PES 
literature and in the Costa Rican PESP functioning (Section 2), we present a 
specific analytical framework to analye the local intermediary organizations’ 
role and contribution to the PESP results. Then we analyze the situation, 
activities and strategy of these organizations (section 3), and we discuss their 
contribution to PESP results (section 4). We conclude discussing the 
implication of the role of these organizations on the caracterisation of the 
governance of the PESP (section 5).  
2 Background  
2.1. Intermediaries in PES literature  
Consideration on intermediaries in PES has been mainly part of a wider 
discussion on the role of organizations and institutions in the development and 
delivery of PES (Bosselmann and Lund, 2012). Many roles and functions of 
the intermediaries have been point out in the PES functioning: 1) setting up 
ES market and transferring payment from users to providers (Vatn, 2010), 
mediating and arbitrating among different parties involved in PES Schemes 
(Pham  et al., 2010), or building trust between different stakeholders (Perrot-
Maitre, 2006). While there is no consensus on the role and definition of PES 
intermediaries, but we can basically define PES intermediaries as an actor that 
facilitates the transaction or agreement between the ES provider and ES users.  
 
Regarding the potential effect on PES performance , intermediaries are often 
considred as a way to favor inclusion of poor ES providers in the schemes 
(Bracer et al., 2007; Corbera and Brown, 2008), especially thanks to their 
ability to aggregate supply of small holder and mediate with buyers (Bracer et 
al., 2007). As transaction cost is seen as a limitation for PES development, 
economy of scale is seen as an institutional mechanisms to reduce transaction 
costs for low-income ES sellers (Bracer et al., 2007). Intermediairies can also 
contribute to reduction of transactions costs through automacy of payments 
(Kemkes et al., 2010).  They facilitate the identification of local needs and 
priorities, and thus can orient ES selling toward this priority (Rosa et al., 
2003).  They also can attract investors by ‘bundling’ projects within a country 
to market a large supply of ecosystem services(Chomitz et al., 1999). 
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2.2. Costa Rican PES program and intermediaries  
Costa Rican PESP has been developed in the 1997, in the continuity of 
existing forestry incentives (Daniels et al., 2010; Pagiola, 2008). According to 
4th forestry law # 7575, PES formally recognize 4 ES provided by forest and 
trees plantation : mitigation of green house gazes, protection of watershed and 
hydrological services, biodiversity conservation, and scenic beauty (Pagiola, 
2008).  
 
Funds for the PESP come from different sources. The main sources are the 
contribution through national fuel tax, the loans and grants from international 
donors, while private contracts represented around 3 % of all funds 
(Blackman and Woodward, 2010). Due to the importance of public funds in 
the PES program, PESP has been classified as government-financed PES 
(Wunder et al., 2008).   
 
PES to forest land owners are done for different purposes, which are called 
PES modalities. PESP manage nowadays 5 main modalities: Conservation of 
Forest, Reforestation, Forest Regeneration, Sustainable Forest Management, 
Tree plantation in Agro Forestry System (AFS). The main modality is the 
conservation modality, which represents 89 % of total budget (Blackman and 
Woodward, 2010). Although the mayor amount of the PESP is dedicated to 
this modality, the demand for Conservation PES from land owner is two times 
higher than the available amount. A selection and priorization procedure has 
been set to focus payment according to environmental and social criteria. 
Each year, funds available for each modality and criteria for prioritization of 
applicants are published in an executive decree (Le Coq et al., 2013). 
 
In the functioning of Costa Rican PES program, we can identify two types of 
intermediaries. The first intermediary is the National Forestry Fund 
(FONAFIFO). FONAFIFO is a semi autonomous agency attached to the 
Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE), managed by a public-private 
board (Le Coq et al., 2013). According to the forestry law, FONAFIFO is in 
charge of PES program management, that is to say raising funds for the 
program (i.e. selling ES from Costa Rican forest and plantation), and 
distribute them to the forest land owner for the provision of ES from their 
forest or tree plantation (i.e. payment of ES to the ES providers). Thus, 
FONAFIFO set contracts with forest landowners (Fig. 1), where the former is 
engaged to make the payment, and the latter give their rights on the ES of 
their their forest, and commit to assume forest protection, reforestation, tree 
plantation in AFS, regeneration or sustainable management practice. The 
direct monitoring and control of the forest landowner is done by a private 
actor, a certified forest engineer, the forestry regent (regente forestal), and the 
 5 
overall control of the law by the landowner is under the responsibility of the 
National System of Conservation Area (SINAC) (Le Coq et al., 2013). 
Fig. 1: PESP functioning principle  
 
 
Source: Le Coq et al, 2013 
  
Analyzing in more detail the implementation of PESP (Fig. 2), a second type 
of intermediary in the PESP can be identified: the Forestry Organizations 
which consist in a variety of organizations involved in PES implementation 
(Méndez Gamboa and Salazar Chaves, 2010). Although their numbers vary 
according to definition
1
 and authors (Borge Carvajal, 2006; Bosselmann and 
Lund, 2012; Méndez Gamboa and Salazar Chaves, 2010), we can consider 
that they are 17 organizations currently playing a role of intermediary in 
PESP, that is to say facilitating the transaction between ES provider and the 
ES buyer (in that case, FONAFIFO, as the central intermediairy of the 
system). According to Bosselmann and Lund (2012), more than half of the 
PES contract signed between 2005 and 2009 was facilitated by organizations 
and, in some canton it was up to 90% of all contracts (Bosselmann and Lund, 
2012). According to other source, from 2000 to 2009, these organizations 
                                                     
1
 Some authors refers to Forestry Organization, as the affiliated to National 
Forestry Office (ONF) (Barrentes, 2009), while other only consider the organizations 
that are directly involved in PES activities, i.e. presenting PES demands to 
FONAFIFO (Borge Carvajal, 2006; Méndez Gamboa and Salazar Chaves, 2010). 
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facilitate the contractualisation of 123,521 ha under protection modality, 
7,882 ha under reforestation modality and 1,341,820 trees
2
 under Agro 
Forestry System (AFS) modality, which represent respectively 27%, 23% and 
45% of the total amount contracted by FONAFIFO for these respective 
modalities during this period (Tab. 1). 
Fig. 2. PESP implementation and local intermediary organizations (LIO) 
 
Source: Authors based on stakeholders interviews 2010-2013.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
2
 AFS modality was created in 2003. Thus, this figure corresponds to 2003-2009 
period. 
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Tab. 1: Importance of Local Intermediary Organization in Costa Rican PES Program 
collocation by modality (2000-2009) 
PES 
Modality  
 Indicators 2000 2005 2009 
Total  
 (2000-2009) 
 Conservation   Total contracted (ha)      26 583         53 493         52 018          458 042    
 
 Total contracted 
through LOI (Ha)  
      5 083         18 062         14 748          123 521    
 
 % LOI on total 
contracted  
19% 34% 28% 27% 
 Reforestation    Total contracted (ha)        2 457           3 602           4 018            33 930    
 
 Total contracted 
through LOI (Ha)  
         562              802              725              7 882    
  
 % LOI on total 
contracted  
23% 22% 18% 23% 
 Agro 
forestry* 
 Total contracted (trees)  
 
   513 684       370 187       2 972 034    
 
 Total contracted 
through LOI (Trees)   
   186 638       273 692       1 341 820    
  
 % LOI on total 
contracted  
  36% 74% 45% 
NB:  LIO: Local Intermediary Organization  
*: Agro forestry modality begun in 2003;  
Source: Authors adapted from ONF database presented in Méndez-Gamboa and 
Salazar-Chaves ( 2010)  
 
These forestry organizations can have different status: cooperatives, Cantonal 
Agricultural Centre (CAC), foundation, nongovernmental organizations 
(NGO) associations (Méndez Gamboa and Salazar Chaves, 2010). 
Nevertheless, they all facilitate all phase of the process of application and 
implementation of PESP (Bosselmann and Lund, 2012). These organizations 
prepare the demand from forest land owner, present it to FONAFIFO, and 
prepare the PES contract signature. When the contract is signed, they monitor 
and control the activities of landowner, realize the annual disbursement 
demands to FONAFIFO, they receive the fund and distribute them to the land 
owners. Moreover, since 2005, a quota in term of number of hectares to be 
contracted by modality has been assigned to these organizations in order to 
secure their participation, facilitate the planning of activities, and research of 
new beneficiaries of PES (Méndez Gamboa and Salazar Chaves, 2010). 
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Defined according the global capacity of these organizations and their 
potential development of activities, the quota is set to favor inclusion of 
smallholders
3
. 
 
To take into account their specific function in PESP functioning, and 
differentiate them form FONAFIFO that is acting at national level, we will 
refers to these organizations as PES Local Intermediary Organizations (LIO), 
as there scope of activities is rooted in local areas.  
3 Conceptual framework and method 
3.1. Conceptual framework  
To analyze the role of LIO in the PESP, we mobilized three concepts from 
economic and sociology of organizations (Fig. 3): the concept of global 
commodity chain (Gereffi, 1994) transaction cost (Williamson, 1985) and 
system of services (Albert et al., 2001).  
 
To analyze the role of the LIO in the PESP, we conceptualized the PES 
mechanism as a Global Commodity Chain (GCC). This conceptualization 
supposes to consider the ES as a commodity, which has been largely criticized 
(Kosoy and Corbera, 2010). Moreover, in the specific case of PESP, this 
conceptualization could be discussed as PESP nature is bundled and ES are 
not trade alone, but are considered as the results of land use adoption (forest 
conservation) or practice (reforestation, regeneration, tree planting in AFS). 
Nevertheless, we adopt this conceptualization as it is compatible with 
Wunders PES definition that has been applied to PESP by many scholars and 
also the promoters and managers of Costa Rican PESP. We also adopt this 
conceptualization in order to better caracterize the role of LOI in the 
coordination and the transaction. Following this conceptualization, we 
consider that the ES of Costa Rican forest are sold from stage to stage from 
local producers, which are the forest land owner, to the final users who are its 
“consumer” (ES user). In this communication, we will not analyze all the 
stage of the commodity chain (till final consumer), but will focus our analysis 
on the first stages from landowner onward to FONAFIFO where LOI are 
involved. 
 
                                                     
3
 In 2010, quota is for project of less than 80 ha for conservation and 50 ha en 
reforestation PES contracts (site ONF, http://onfcr.org/document/mecanismo-de-
distribucion-de-cuotas-psa-2010-ppt/ - accessed may 2013).  
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Fig 3:  Conceptual framework for LIO analysis in PESP  
 
Source: Authors 
 
Developed to understand the nature of the firm (Williamson, 1985), the 
Transaction Cost (TC) has been mobilized in PES literature (Engel et al., 
2008; Vatn, 2010)..Transactions costs for PES are due to information needed 
to create the mechanism, logistical costs, and maintenance costs (Wunder et 
al., 2008). Authors argues that TC may explain the emergence of different 
forms of PES in particular national PES and buyer-financed PES (Vatn, 
2010). In this communication, we will not analyze all the TC of the PESP (i.e. 
Costs to create the mechanism, logistical and maintance). We will consider 
the TC in the GCC, but focussing our analysis on the the transaction between 
the beneficiary of PESP (forest land owner) and FONAFIFO, and the role of 
LOI in this transaction. Thus, we will consider TC as the costs incurred by 
participants in order to initiate or complete the transaction (setting the PESP 
Contract), considering five typical component of TC : search costs, 
negotiation costs, approval costs, monitoring costs, enforcement costs and 
insurance costs (Dudek and Wiener, 1996). 
 
Finally, to analyze the strategy of LIO and their interactions with forest land 
owners, we mobilized the concept of System of services. This concept has 
been developed to analyze the agricultural extension services in the context of 
reduction of State support to agriculture (Albert et al., 2001). Services are the 
different goods or services necessary to achieve an activity; they can be 
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tangible services (such as inputs provision) or intangible services (such as 
information, advices...). This concept has been mobilized to understand 
strategies of farmers organizations to provide activities for agricultural and 
rural development (Le Coq et al., 2009). We will apply this concept to the 
LOI to analyze their relationship with forest landowner and their strategy, and 
the contribution of LIO activities to landowner activities. 
 
Finally, to discuss the contribution of LOI to the results and performance of 
PESP, we will consider in this paper a limited number of criteria such as 1) 
economic efficiency though the Transaction Cost linked with LOI activity, 2) 
the contribution to the accessibility of landowner to the PESP, 3) the 
contribution to the economic interest of the land owner to adopt the PES 
contractual practice or land use, and 4) the contribution to the extension of the 
economic incentive oportunity toward the land owners.  
3.2. Data collection  
Based on national office of forestry (Oficina Nacional Forestal - ONF) and 
FONAFIFO database, we establish a list of forestry organizations involved in 
PES. Then, crossing with information from FONAFIFO and other reports 
from ONF
4
, we identified a list of 17 organizations involved in PES 
intermediation
5
. We gather information about all these organizations 
regarding their trajectory, past and current global and PES related activities. 
This information was complemented with information on their current 
perception on forest issue, PES program and strategy during direct interviews 
with representatives of the organizations. 
4. Local Intermediary Organizations 
4.1. Types, objectives and relative importance in PESP 
The analysis of LOI trajectories and objectives shows that LOI are of three 
main types: 1) agricultural oriented organizations such as cooperatives or 
cantonal agricultural centre (Centro Agricola Cantonal - CAC), 2) forestry 
oriented organization, and 3) conservation oriented organization.  
 
                                                     
4
 We used in particular the database of ONF developed by Norman in 2009, as well 
as a report from Mendez Gamboa & Salazar Chaves (2010). 
5
 In 2009, there were 18 organizations involved in PES intermediation according to 
Bosselmann and Lund (2012), but one organization stopped this activity meanwhile.  
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The first type of organization is the most numerous groups of LOI (Tab. 2). 
The initial purpose of these organizations was agricultural development. They 
were created 70s or 80s either directly by the ministry of agriculture to 
provide agriculture services to farmers such as fertilizer distribution, 
agricultural technology transfer, in the case of  CAC, or indirectly promoted 
by the administration to strengthen small famers in agricultural development 
process, in the case of the cooperatives. These two categories of organizations 
developed forestry related activities with different vision and objectives. For 
the CAC, forestry activities have been a reorientation that enables them to 
survive the reduction of the public supports in agricultural sectors in the 80s-
90s. This reorientation of their activities was also seen as a way to overcome 
difficulties in agricultural sector and environmental problems (soil erosion, 
water scarcity) in their area. Hence, in the 80s with the support from 
international projects and/or the General Direction of Forestry, some CAC 
developed reforestation programs. Nowadays, for these organizations, e.g. 
CAC Hojancha or CAC Nanyadure in the Nicoya peninsula or the CAC 
Puriscal or CAC Esparza in the Pacific Central region, forestry activities 
could be one of the mayor activities of the organization. In the case of the 
agricultural cooperative, development of forestry activities has been 
integrated to promote a diversification of activity and incomes of their 
members. But, contrasting with CAC, these organizations still maintain an 
important set of activities and services oriented toward the agricultural 
activities. That’s the case for example for Coopeagri, one of the biggest LOI, 
but also a major coffee and sugarcane cooperative of the country. Although 
this type of LOI is the more numerous, it manages only a small amount of 
hectares of PES conservation and reforestation in comparison with the 
forestry oriented organizations (Tab.2). These organizations are more oriented 
toward SAF modality in which they collocate 44% of tree under SAF 
modality managed by LOI. 
 
The second type of organizations, the forestry oriented organizations, consist 
nowadays in 3 large organizations (Tab. 2). This type of organization has been 
promoted specifically by the General Direction of Forestry in the 80s to 
incentive reforestation and sustainable forest management, and had been 
generally supported by international cooperation program at their early stage 
of development. These organizations are oriented toward reforestation and 
wood production for the wood industry such as Codeforsa, or tend to develop 
a more conservation orientation such as Asirea or Fundecor. They may be of 
different status, cooperative (Codeforsa), or association (Asirea) or NGO 
(Fundecor). Although many forestry oriented organizations was created in the 
80s, their number have been reducing since then due to the reduction of direct 
support to forestry organizations (Barrantes, 2009). Thus, nowadays, only 3 
organizations of this type are acting as PES intermediary. Nevertheless these 
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organizations are the biggest regarding PES intermediation, as they allocate 
67% of the total area of PES conservation allocated by LOI, 76% of total area 
of PES reforestation allocated by LOI and 51 % of tree in SAF contract 
allocated by LOI (Tab. 2).  
The third type of LOI, the conservation-oriented organizations, has been 
created more recently, in the late 90s – 2000s, in relationship with the raising 
awareness of the environmental issue in Costa Rica. Association or 
foundation, their primary objective is the conservation of natural habitat. They 
are working in biologic corridors (such as the association of the Biologic 
Corridor of the Talamanca Chain - CBCT) or with forest reserve (Fundecongo 
in the Peninsula of Nicoya). For these organizations, the PES program is seen 
as a way to consolidate conservation efforts, and they are mainly oriented 
toward PES conservation modality (Tab. 2). PES intermediation is usually not 
the main activities of the organization since most of them developed other 
activities such as eco-tourism activities.  
Tab. 2:  PES intermediation by types of organization from 2000 to 2009  
PES 
Modality 
Criteria 
agriculture 
oriented 
organizations 
forestry 
oriented 
organizations 
conservation 
oriented 
organizations 
total 
 
 
n=10* n=3 n=4** n=17 
Conservation Total area (ha)  26 282 83 221 14 018 123 521 
 
Total area (%)  21% 67% 11% 100% 
 
Average area per 
organization (ha) 
2 920 27 740 7 009 8 823 
Reforestation Total area (ha)  1 844 5 971 67 7 882 
 
Total area (%)  23% 76% 1% 100% 
 
Average area per 
organization (ha) 
205 1 990 34 563 
Agro forestry 
Total tree number 
(trees)  
594 162 685 008 62 650 1 341 820 
 
Total tree number 
(%)  
44% 51% 5% 100% 
 
Average tree 
number per 
organization 
(tree) 
66 018 228 336 31 325 95 844 
NB: * data available for 9 organizations, ** data available for 2 organizations  
Source: Adapted from ONF database Méndez Gamboa and Salazar Chaves, 2010 
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4.2. Spatial distribution and scope of action 
Local Intermediary Organizations are present in all the Costa Rican regions 
(Fig. 4). Each LOI has its area of intervention; there is no concurrence 
between them related to forest landowner. The three forestry oriented 
organizations have the larger scope of actions and are working in the northern 
and eastern areas. Except Coopeagri that have a large scope of intervention, 
the agricultural oriented organizations have a local scope of intervention.  
Fig. 4: Spatial distribution of Local Intermediary Organizations in Costa Rica  
 
Source: Authors, interviews in 2011-2012 
NB: a conservation oriented organization was not represented in the map as it has a 
scattered zone of intervention throughout the country. 
4.3. Activities and strategy 
Local Intermediary Organizations developed a more or less large scope of 
activities, including PES intermediation.  
 
Agriculture -oriented organizations
Forestry -oriented organizations
Conservation -oriented organizations
Source: authors
 14 
Activities of PES intermediation. All these LOI developed different services 
to their members or landowner to facilitate their access to PESP. Linked with 
PES intermediation, they assume the following activities. First, they promote 
the PESP by broadcasting information on PESP content, procedure, access 
conditions. Second, they prepare the file of PES demand, assembling 
necessary documents from land owners, and verifying the acceptability of the 
demand. When problem occurs they help to achieve resolution by assisting 
landowners in administrative or technical procedure. When the pre-demand is 
accepted by FONAFIFO, they prepare the contract between land owner and 
FONAFIFO, and realized the necesary technical studies, and management 
plan. They also assist the landowners in the signature of the contract. When 
the contract is signed, they received the payment and distribute to the final 
beneficiary of the program. Further they monitor activities of the landowner 
and make the demand for disbursement every year during the contract 
duration. 
 
To develop these activities, they need to mobilize different abilities: 
administrative, technical, and juridical ones. Work organization and human 
resources management differs according to organizations. Some organizations 
conduct all the function internally with their own employees, other rely on 
internal and external human resources. Regarding administrative activities, 
they generaly perform it with their own human resources. For the technical 
abilities (forestry, geographic information system), they have in general their 
own forestry engineer accredited as forestry regent to set regency contract and 
assume the technical expertise.  However, some small organizations use the 
services of independent private forestry regent, as they don’t have enough 
members with PSA to cover a full time cost of foresty regent. Finally, 
regarding juridical abilities, most of the organizations mobilize external 
human ressources.  
 
Activities aside PES intermediation. Aside PES intermediation, the LIO 
perform other activities according to the objective of the organization. Among 
agricultural oriented organizations, the main other activities are agricultural 
activities promotion (Tab.3). The CAC are are involved agricultural fair 
administration which provide them regular incomes in comparison with PESP 
intermediation. Some CAC are nowadays totally specialized in forestry 
related activities and then PESP is an important activity of their incomes. The 
cooperative developped many activities to support agricultural production 
such as input supply or extension, but they also develop processing and 
comercialization activities. PES intermediation is a diversification activities, 
that provide them a complement but they don’t depend on them. The forestry 
oriented organizations have developed generally activities oriented toward the 
promotion of forest sector, including processing, industrialization, and 
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services of information on wood price. Some of them also tend to develop 
project of promotion of bio products. As PESP has become one of the 
principal forestry support policy, the PES intermediation is an important 
activity for the organization. Finally, the conservation oriented organization 
developped mainly environemental eduction activities and promotion of eco-
tourism activities. 
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Tab. 3: Local Intermediary Organization and activities profiles 
Activities  
agriculture 
oriented 
organizations 
forestry 
oriented 
organizations 
conservation 
oriented 
organizations 
  n=10* n=3 n=4** 
Agriculture promotion activities  
Support to agricultural production  100% 0% 0% 
 
Agricultural fair administration  
 
70% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
Agricultural products processing and 
commercialization  50% 0% 0% 
Forestry promotion activities 
Plant nursery 50% 100% 0% 
forestry advice 100% 100% 25% 
maintenance / processing / marketing 10% 100% 0% 
forestry credit 20% 100% 0% 
Conservation promotion activities 
environmental education 20% 100% 100% 
tourism related  10% 33% 50% 
Others 
   
commercial  20% 0% 0% 
credit  30% 0% 0% 
social  40% 0% 0% 
Source: Authors, ONF data base 2009 and interviews in 2011-2012 
5. LIO y PESP performance 
5.1. LOI and PESP transaction costs 
Transaction Cost of PESP is an important issue as it affects the financial 
efficiency of the program and the access of small holder to the program. TC 
can be grasped at two levels, TC at FONAFIFO level and TC at landowners 
level. 
 
Regarding financial efficiency of the PESP attention has been paid to the 
operational costs of FONAFIFO as the main intermediary of the PESP. Thus, 
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since its creation, the cost of operation of the PESP has been carefully 
regulated by decree (Tab. 4). Since its beginning, the maximum percentage of 
the operational cost of the PESP total budget has been changed. When the 
program begun in 1997 the maximum administrative cost of PESP was 
established 7% to be captured by FONAFIFO and distributed between 
FONAFIFO (5%) and SINAC (2%) to cover respectively the operative costs 
PESP assumed by FONAFIFO and the control cost assumed by SINAC. 
Then, this amount was upgraded in 2006 to some 10% raising the share to 
FONAFIFO to some 7% and including a 1% share to ONF. In 2008, it further 
jumped up with the reforms of FONAFIFO status that implies a change of 
administrative structure. It raised then some 21 % including 19 % for 
FONAFIFO, 1.33% to SINAC, and 0.67 % to ONF. 
 
This cost of operation includes the Transaction Cost of both the transaction 
between FONAFIFO and PESP Funders (to set contract with ES buyers) as 
well as transaction between FONAFIFO and ES providers (forest 
landowners). An rough analisis of the structure of FONAFIFO functioning 
enable to estimate that the majority of this cost is mainly dedicated in the 
administration of the relationship with the ES providers
6
.  
Tab. 4: PESP transaction costs at FONAFIFO level and its distribution (1997 to 
2013) 
 1997 2006 2008 
Maximum % operational cost 
on total PESP budget  
7% 10% 21,00% 
To FONAFIFO 5% 7% 19,00% 
To SINAC 2% 2% 1,33% 
To ONF  1% 0,67% 
Source: Authors based on Decree 25721 of 23/01/1997; Decree 30762 of 
09/10/2002; Decree 32750 of 11/11/2005, Decree 33205 of 05/06/2006 and 
Decree 34761 of 15/07/2008. 
 
The second level where TC can be evidenced is between forest landowner and 
FONAFIFO. This TC takes into account the different element that enables 
landowner access to PES contract with FONAFIFO. This cost is highly 
variable and include the research of a regent, the cost of the regent, the 
administrative costs to set the contract (that may include various adjustment to 
comply with the PESP legal requisite such as land title), the cost of 
monitoring and maintance of the contract. Among this different costs, the cost 
                                                     
6
 As FONAFIFO represent around 110 persons, two areas are specifically in charge 
of downward relationship, i.e. promotion and marketing of ES unit and proyect 
definicion unit, that both represent 6 persons. Evenif we consider that other unit also 
contribute to the monitoring of the contract toward downward actors. We can estimate 
that downward costs represent around 10 - 30 % of the total administrative cost.  
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of the forestry regent in charge of the technical studies (management plan), 
and the monitoring and control that the landowner comply witht the contract 
or the LOI is regulated: the fee paid is limited to an 18 % of the amount of 
PES received by the beneficiary. Recent studies shows difference between 
private regent regency costs and LIO costs including regency (Tab. 5). In the 
northern region, regency cost paid by farmers range between 10 to 18 % 
depending on the size of the contract. Whereas an average declared regency 
cost was 12,26 % in the case of private regent, it was of 15,40 % though LIO
7
 
(Lamarre, 2012). In the southern region, a recent studies of PSA, confirms the 
same tendency,  whereas regency costs were between 5 to 10 % for private 
regent, it was between 12 à 18% for LIO regency (Roussel, 2012).  
 
Tab. 5: PESP transaction costs at Farmers level: regency costs  
 
Cost of regency 
(private regent) 
Cost of regency 
(LIO regency) 
northern region (a) 12,26 % 15,40% 
southern region (b) 5-10% 12-18% 
Source: (a) Lamarre (2012), (b) Roussel (2012) 
 
Thus, in comparison with private regent facilitation, there is no evidence that 
LIO is reducing TC assumed by landowners. However, this difference can be 
explained by the average area of contract assumed by LIO. Indeed, in area 
where LIO is operating, private regents tend to work with larger land owners 
and thus achieved economy of scale (as the proportion of fix cost of in the 
intermediation activities, is higher than area proportional cost) in comparison 
with LIO that work with small contracts.  
5.2. LIO and provision of a set of services 
Contribution of LIO to the performance of PESP in term of accessibility and 
interest of PESP can be seen through the set of services provided by LIO to 
the landowner.  
 
Regarding system of services around the landowner, the LIO contribute to 
propose two set of services (Fig. 5): 1) a chain of services that facilitates 
landowner access to the PESP, 2) a chain of service that enables to better 
economically valorize the contractual practice or land use under PES contract.  
 
The first set of services is the integrated set of services around the function of 
PESP intermediation that consist in chain of different specific services of 
                                                     
7
 The LIO put tin practice digressive tariff raising from 15.8 to 10.8 for larger scale 
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different nature (administrative, technical, juridical) organized toward the 
resolution of the complex procedure of application to the PESP.  
 
The second subsystem of services is the (more or less complete) set of 
services that enable to implement contractual practice (such as reforestation) 
or land use (such as protection) and valorize economically these practices or 
land use. As such, the forestry oriented organizations and most of the 
agricultural oriented organization that promote reforestation, also assume a 
supply system of tree seedling, facilitate access to specific credit system, 
technical advice system, and some of them also propose services of plantation 
maintenance and/or wood extraction. To help  farmer better valorize their tree 
plantation, some of them also propose a first processing facilities or marketing 
services, and or facilitate the access to sustainability certifications (such as 
FSC - Forest Stewardship Council) that enable to get better wood marketing 
opportunities. To support forest conservation, some LIO also propose a 
support service that enables income diversification though sustainable 
agricultural production, or Eco-tourism.  
Fig. 5: Farmers activities, land use and system of services  
 
Source: Authors derived from LOI interviews 2010-2012 
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5.3. LIO and complementary PES  
Some LIO with more financial and human capacities developped additional 
projects to incentive conservation or reforestation. 
 
Two main examples can be mentioned. The first one is “Solidarity PES” 
developed by Fundecor. This specific PES mechanism is funded by a private 
transport enterprise (a Rent A Car) committed in environmental issue and that 
wanted to compensate the carbon emission. It benefited also from 
complementary funding support of cooperation funding, enable to finance 
some 2000 ha of conservation PES between 2010 and 2012. This mechanism 
enable to integrate some forest landowners committed in forest conservation 
but that could not access PESP for legal reasons (land tenure) or for limited 
resources of PESP funding and the system of priority.  
 
Another example is the Coopeagri Clean Development Mechanism project 
that enables to raise additional fund for reforestation, regeneration and tree 
planting in AFS over 892 hectares. This project developed by Coopeagri 
benefited also from the support from FONAFIFO that is using it as a pilot to 
access this financial resource. It enables to extend the source of funding of 
FONAFIFO and enlarge the number of local landowner that benefit from a 
financial incentive. 
 
It is worth notice that the development of complementary PES incentive 
system is also developped by some forestry organizations that are not directly 
involved in PESP. However, this initiative contributes to the same objective 
of national forest conservation and recuperation of the national forest area. In 
this regards, we can mention pilots’ projects developed by an association 
supporting agroforestry sytem (ACICAFOC) in the indigenous region of 
Costa Rica. 
 
5.4. LIO, representation of forest landowners and coordination with 
FONAFIFO  
The LIO, through their membership to the National Forestry Office (ONF), 
or directly, represent the forest landowner interest and play a role in the 
decision making process of the PESP. They contribute in the rule setting 
though different form. First, LIO are one the actors (along with private regent 
and Fonafifo local staff) that provide feedback on the situation in local areas. 
Moreover, with their distribution among the country, they contribute through 
ONF to provide nationwide information. Secondly, they are directly involved 
in PESP management through their representation in the FONAFIFO board 
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(as 2 out of 5 membre of the board comes from ONF). Thus, they can directly 
discuss PESP rules and they were particularly active in different changes, 
such as the creation of SAF modality in 2003, the reevaluation of the amount 
of PES reforestation contracts in 2009 or the reactivation of sustainable forest 
management in 2010.  
 
Regarding coordination between LIO and FONAFIFO, we can observ that 
LIO are recognized by FONAFIFO administration as a partner that cooperate 
in the implementation the PESP, as they contribute to promotion of the 
program, the search of beneficiary that cope with priority criteria’s. Their 
activities of preparation enable to meet the objective of allocation of PESP 
and small farmer’s access to PESP.  
 
6. Conclusion  
In the Costa Rica, a set of local intermediary organization is involved in the 
PESP implementation since its begining. These organizations, which a large 
majority existed prior to the PESP implementation, have different trajectories, 
visions, objective and strategy. Three types of organizations according to their 
main orientation have been identified: agricultural, forestry and conservation 
oriented organizations. Although they all carry out PES intermediation 
activities for forest land owners, they are not specialized in this activity. All of 
them have developped a set of activities, according to their main orientation. 
Agricutltural oriented organizations are involved in agricultural product 
processing or comercialization. Forestry oriented organizations often 
developed other activities regarding reforestation and wood production. 
Conservationist organizations are often involved in tourism ecotourism 
actitivity or promotion..  
 
These Local Intermediary Organizations are important in the PESP 
implementation and are contributing to its results in different way. If they LIO 
do not clearly contribute to reduce transactions costs, they contribute to the 
results of PESP in different dimension. First, providing a specific integrated 
system of PESP intermediation services, they facilitate access to PESP to 
small land owner with limited capacities. Second, creating an enabling system 
of services around smallholders for reforestation and forest conservation, they 
help the small holder to comply with the PESP contractual practices or land 
use. More over, they contribute to increase income generation opportunities 
from PES contractual practices or land use. Third, developping 
complementary private PES schemes, they contribute to enlarge the number 
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of forest owner receiving incentive beyond PESP financial capacity and 
juridical limitations.  
 
Finally, taking into account the involvement of these organizations in the 
PESP implementation and their contribution to its results, the PESP can be 
considered neither as a pure market coordination, nor a pure hierarchical 
coordination, but as a hybrid coordination system where public intermediary 
(FONAFIFO) collaborate with private intermediaries (LIO) to achieve 
collective and national goals of forest conservation.  
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